Case Study United States v. O’Hagan, law homework help

There are 2 different case study that need to be read, and the question that's in the bullet point needs to be answer in one paragraph for each. Please, keep the case study and answers together. Thank youCase32.2 - United States v. O’Hagan" Please respond to the following:Assess whether asecurities firm will be more likely to modify its behavior in businessbased upon the holding of this case. If you were employed in thesecurities profession, state one particular way in which you modify yourapproach to be transparent to both your client and the Securities andExchange Commission.Case 32.2 – U.S. SUPREME COURTMisappropriation Theory; United States v. O’Hagan; 521 U.S. 642, 117, S.Ct. 2199, 138L.Ed. 2d 724, Web 1997 U.S. Lexis 4033; Supreme Court of the United States “Themisappropriation theory outlaws trading on the basis of nonpublic informationby a corporate ‘outsider’ in breach of a duty owed not to a trading party, butto the source of the information.” – Justice GinsburgFacts:James O’Hagan was a partner in the law firm Dorsey & Whitney inMinneapolis, Minnesota, Grand Metropolitan PLC (Grand Met), a company based inLondon, England, hired Dorsey & Whitney to represent it in a secret tenderoffer for the stock of the Pillsbury Company, headquartered in Minneapolis.While this transaction was still secret, O’Hagan began purchasing call optionsfor Pillsbury stock. Each call option gave O’Hagan the right to purchase 100shares of Pillsbury stock at a specified price. O’Hagan continued to purchasecall options for 2 months, and he became the largest holder of call options forPillsbury stock. O’Hagan also purchase 5,000 shares of Pillsbury common stockat $39 per share. These purchases were all made while Grand Met’s proposedtender offer for Pillsbury remained secret to the public. When Grand Metpublicly announced its tender offer 1 month later, Pillsbury stock increased tonearly $60 per share. O’Hagan sold his Pillsbury call options and common stock,making a profit of more than $4.3 million.TheU.S. Department of Justice charged O’Hagan with criminally violating Section10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Because this was not a case of classic insider tradingbecause O’Hagan did not trade in the stock of his law firm’s client, Grand Met,the government alleged that O’Hagan was liable under the misappropriationtheory for trading in Pillsbury stock by engaging in deceptive conduct by misappropriatingthe secret information about Grand Met’s tender offer from his employer, Dorsey& Whitney, and from its client, Grand Met. The District Court found O’Haganguilty and sentenced him to 41 months in prison. The Eighth Circuit Court ofAppeals reversed, finding that liability under Section 10b and Rule 10b-5cannot be based on the misappropriation theory. The government appealed to theU.S. Supreme Court. Languageof the U.S. Supreme Court: The“misappropriation theory” holds that a person commits fraud “in connectionwith” a securities transaction, and thereby violates Section 10(b) and Rule10b-5, when he misappropriates confidential information for securities tradingpurposes, in breach of a duty owed to the information. Under this theory, afiduciary’s undisclosed, self-serving use of a principal’s information topurchase or sell securities, in breach of a duty of loyalty andconfidentiality, defrauds the principal of the exclusive use of thatinformation.Theclassical theory targets a corporate insider’s breach of duty to shareholderswith whom the insider transacts; the misappropriation theory outlaws trading onthe basis of nonpublic information by a corporate “outsider” in breach of dutyowed not to a trading party, but to the source of the information. Themisappropriation theory comports with Section 10(b)’s language, which requiresdeception “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”Decision:The U.S. Supreme Court held that a defendant can be criminally convicted ofviolating Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-c under the misappropriation theory. TheU.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, which hadheld otherwise."Case36.4" Please respond to the following:If you were inSuders’ position and felt harassed by coworkers, who were also policeofficers, determine what recourse you would have under Title VII. Case 36.4 U.S. Supreme Court SexualHarassment; Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders; 542 U.S. 129 S.Ct. 2342 159 L.Ed. 2d204, Web 2004 U.S. Lexis 4176 (2004); Supreme Court of the U. S.“Essentially, Suders presents a‘worse case’ harassment scenario, harassment ratcheted up to the breakingpoint.” – Justice GinsburgFacts: The Pennsylvania State Police(PSP) hired Nancy Drew Suders as a police communications operator for theMcConnellsburg barracks. Suders’s supervisors were Sergeant Eric D. Easton,station commander at the McConnellsburg barracks, Patrol Corporal William D.Baker, and Corporal Eric B. Prendergast. Those three supervisors subjectedSuders to a continuous barrage of sexual harassment that ceased only when sheresigned from the force. Easton would bring up the subject of people having sexwith animals each time Suders entered his office. He told Prendergast, in frontof Suders, that young girls should be given instruction on how to gratify menwith oral sex. Easton also would sit down near Suders, wearing Spandex shorts,and spread his legs apart. Baker repeatedly made an obscene gesture in Suders’spresence that involved grabbing his genitals and shouting out a vulgar commentinviting oral sex. Baker made this gesture as many as five to ten times pernight throughout Suders’s employment at the barracks. Further, Baker would rubhis rear end in front of her and remark “I have a nice ass, don’t I?” Five months after being hired, Suderscontacted Virginia Smith-Elliot, PSP’s equal opportunity officer, stating thatshe was being harassed at work and was afraid. Smith-Elliot’s response appearedto Suders to be insensitive and unhelpful. Two days later, Suders resigned fromthe force. Suders sued PSP, alleging that she had been subject to sexualharassment and constructively discharged and forces to resign. The U.S.District Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for trial on themerits against PSP. PSP appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. Language of the U.S. Supreme Court: To establish hostile work environment,plaintiffs like Suders must show harassing behavior sufficiently severe orpervasive to alter the conditions of their employment. The very fact that thediscriminatory conduct was so severe or pervasive that it created a workenvironment abusive to employees because of their gender offends Title VII’sbroad rule of work equality. Essentially,Suders presents a “worse case” harassment scenario, harassment ratcheted up tothe breaking point. Harassment so intolerable as to cause a resignation may beeffected through co-worker conduct, unofficial supervisory conduct, or officialcompany acts. Unlike an actual termination, which is always effected through anofficial act of the company, a constructive discharge need not be. Aconstructive discharge involves both an employee’s decision to leave andprecipitating conduct. Decision: The U.S. Supreme Courtagreed with the U.S. Court of Appeals that Suders’s case presented genuineissues of materials fact concerning Suders’s hostile work environment andconstructive discharge claims. The U.S. Supreme Court remanded the case forfurther proceedings consistent with its opinion.